A Synthesis of Relativism and Genetics

A theory is an interrelation of constructs from which hypotheses are developed to explain the relationship between variables (Creswell, 2009). A general cultural relativity hypothesis proposes that perceptions are shaped through the process of socialization (Cheng, Cheung, Chio, & Chan 2013). Cheng et al. (2013) examine this relativism in their multicultural meta-analysis of the relationship between causal perceptions and negative psychological symptoms. Similarly, the research of Vauclair and Fischer (2011) demonstrates the relationship between individual attitudes and cultural context. However, their study also indicates that, although some values are divergent between societies, many other priorities are held in most cultures (Vauclair & Fischer, 2011). Another theory proposes that the evolutionary history of all humanity results in many traits that are common throughout the many diverse civilizations (Haidt, 2007). In his article, Haque (2011) argues that human moral psychology cannot be reduced to arbitrary social conventions. He concludes by noting that the dichotomy between biological and social origins is false (Haque, 2011). Often, subjective values result from the expression of inherited characteristics in the context of a dynamic environment (Haque, 2011).

The debate between theories, regarding the origin of behavioral and perceptual patterns, results from contrary definitions of the independent variable. Both evolutionary and cultural theories assign behavior as the dependent variable. The value of this dependent variable is determined by that of the causal antecedent (Creswell, 2009). Evolutionary theories attribute behavior patterns to the common human history of adaptation (Haque, 2011). In contrast, culturally relative theories assert that behavior patterns are learned through socialization (Haque, 2011). However, both theories have merit, and it is likely that their synthesis produces the most accurate representation (Haque, 2011). Intervening variables are agents that contribute to a result dependent on an independent value (Creswell, 2009). Biology and society complement each other to shape the behavior of the individual (Haque, 2011).

Benassi, Sweeney, and Dufour (1988) documented a general link between psychological stress and the perception that one has little control over events. This type of universal relationship would be consistent with evolutionary theories. However, Cheng et al. (2013) proposed that collectivist cultures would be more able to psychologically accommodate situations resulting from circumstantial conditions rather than personal motivation. Individualism and collectivism represent an interpretive dimension that functions to delineate the differences between societies (Triandis & Suh, 2002). Cultures oriented towards collectivism socialize individuals to maintain harmony throughout situational changes (Morling, Kitayama, & Miyamoto, 2002). The research of Cheng et al. (2013) integrated measures of anxiety and depression from existing research that assessed these psychological symptoms in different cultures (Cheng et al., 2013). Through statistical analysis, this study quantified the correlation between perceptions regarding the degree of personal control and the frequency of psychological distress (Cheng et al., 2013). The results indicated that collectivist values result in a decreased prevalence of depression and anxiety relative to other cultures that prioritize individuality (Cheng et al., 2013). These results support relativist assertions that perception is shaped by culture.

An artificial origin of many moral principles would result in collections of values that may be unique to a single cultural tradition (Haidt, 2007). For example, Vauclair and Fischer (2011) found that many cultures embrace different priorities that may emphasize autonomy or interdependence. These divergent attitudes result in moral systems that value personal rights while others prioritize obligations and relationships (Vauclair & Fischer, 2011). However, the existence of cultural diversity does not falsify the natural origins of morality (Haque, 2011). The excessive emphasis that is often placed on examples of diversity may ultimately threaten the validity of anthropological interpretations (Haque, 2011). Mikhail (2007) notes that, rather than refuting natural theories of emergence, diversity may indicate a systematic variation of basic principles in the context of environmental circumstances.

While the research of Vauclair and Fischer, (2011) demonstrate that some orientations are specific to a particular culture, their results also indicate that others are found universally. Because social cooperation is adaptive in most contexts, this value is common throughout various societies (Krebs, 2008). Similarly, the research of Hauser, Cushman, Young, Jin and Mikhail (2007) demonstrated a great degree of consistency across cultures in responses to some moral dilemmas. These types of moral universals exhibit little variation in the context of diverse variables (Hauser, et al., 2007). Haque (2011) demonstrates that, although some there may be some divergence in the moral systems of different cultures, morality originates from a common history of psychological evolution. Relativistic assertions that deny the significance of evolutionary history often fail to account for individual deviations from the norms prescribed by cultural orientations (Haque, 2011).

The debate regarding the origin of values is founded on an artificial opposition between genetic inheritance and developmental learning. However, these contributions are often complimentary rather than contrary (Haque, 2011). Biological processes act throughout the life history (Haque, 2011). Developmental changes are often adaptations that promote the success of an individual in an ecologically dynamic environment (Haque, 2011). This flexibility ensures the maximum functionality of the resulting individual phenotype (Haque, 2011). Behavior patterns represent an entanglement of social and biological values. Intervening variables of this type are both causally related to the effect (Creswell, 2009).

References

Benassi, V. A., Sweeney, P. D., & Dufour, C. L. (1988). Is there a relation between locus of control orientation and depression? Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 97, 357–367. doi:10.1037/0021-843X.97.3.357

Cheng, C., Cheung, S., Chio, J. H., & Chan, M. S. (2013). Cultural meaning of perceived control: A meta-analysis of locus of control and psychological symptoms across 18 cultural regions. Psychological Bulletin, 39(1), 152-188. doi: 10.1037/a0028596

Creswell, J. W. (2009). Research Design (3rd Ed.). Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications.

Haidt, J. (2007). The new synthesis in moral psychology. Science, 316, 998–1001.

Haque, O. S. (2011). Moral creationism: The science of morality and the mutiny of romantic relativism. Journal of Cognition & Culture, 11, 151-187. doi: 10.1163/156853711X568734

Hauser, M. D., Cushman, F. A., Young, L., Jin, R. and Mikhail, J. M. (2007). A dissociation between moral judgment and justification. Mind and Language, 22, 1-21.

Krebs, D. L. (2008). Morality: An evolutionary account. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3, 149–172.

Mikhail, J. (2007). Universal moral grammar: theory, evidence, and the future. Trends in Cognitive Science, 11, 143-152.

Morling, B., Kitayama, S., & Miyamoto, Y. (2002). Cultural practices emphasize influence in the United States and adjustment in Japan. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28, 311–323. doi:10.1177/ 0146167202286003

Triandis, H. C., & Suh, E. M. (2002). Cultural influences on personality. Annual Review of Psychology, 53, 133–160. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.53.100901.135200

Vauclair, C., & Fischer, R. (2011). Do cultural values predict individuals’ moral attitudes? A multilevel approach. European Journal of Social Psychology, 41, 645-657. doi:10.1002/ejsp.794