On Empiricism: The Epistemic Limitations of Subjectivity

Çakir (2012) explains that scientific disciplines attempt establish theories that are founded on empirical information. Theories are interpretations of meaning that explain the relationship between variables (Creswell, 2009). In quantitative research, these general propositions are tested in order to assess their validity in a particular case. Kabadayi (2007) notes that scientific knowledge is constructed through the elimination of falsified representations. Because specific observations do not necessarily verify a universal concept, a scientific theory must continuously be evaluated in the context of empirical information. However, empiricism does not imply a belief regarding the truth of a proposition (Steup, 2011). Rather, theories are only assumed to represent objectivity to the degree to which they may be assessed. All scientific knowledge is conditional. Contrary empirical evidence invalidates any existing concept.

Empiricism is the assertion that knowledge is acquired through experience (Steup, 2011). Empirical propositions must be changed in accordance with contrary perceptual experiences. However, subjective perception is little evidence that a contingent proposition is true. Empiricism does not imply that an individual believes in the truth of presently accepted scientific theories. Ladyman, Douven, Horsten, and van Fraassen, (1997) explain that the purpose of science is only to establish empirical adequacy. A theory is only ever sufficiently true to explain observations. The conditional nature of propositions invalidates any notions of absolute knowledge. While some ideas may be universally true, the subject has no way of establishing this type of certainty.

Any concept that is coherent and consistent with empirical evidence is epistemologically valid (Dicken, 2009). However, empiricism rejects postulations of elements that are not evident in experience (Van Fraassen, 2004). Without some form of significance, any proposition is unnecessary and meaningless. Although the empiricist cannot conclusively deny the possibility of a superfluous agent, a theory must include pragmatic implications to maintain functionality. If interpretations are intended to represent objectivity, trivial stipulations must be avoided. While there is not any intrinsic moral imperative to ensure that all statements are empirically assessed, a conscientious individual must evaluate all propositions that may motivate significant actions. It may be permissible to indulge in fantasy or polite misrepresentations, but essential assertions must be consistent with empirical evidence to ensure appropriate implementations.

Inductions derive a general theory from finite experiences. While this type of generalization is an effective means of interpretation, no universal concept is immune to eventual falsification (Kabadayi, 2007). A theory provides the foundation for hypothetical predictions (Creswell, 2009). Through deductive assessments, the validity of the theory is evaluated in the context of the particular case. The empirical results of this evaluation either confirm or refute the subjective concept. A theory is conclusively falsified by contrary evidence (Kabadayi, 2007). However, the validity of a theory is only conditionally verified in reference to a particular means of assessment (Çakir, 2012). In order to maximize the accuracy of perceptual representations, concepts must be open to criticism from all sources of evidence. This continuous criticism enables representations to increasingly approximate objectivity.

Although falsification enables the differentiation between valid and invalid concepts, the scientific method does not enable an individual to transcend subjectivity. Any evaluation is an application of an existing methodology (Çakir, 2012). The degree to which a theory may be assessed is limited by the means with which the assessment is performed. While evidence may or may not be consistent with a hypothesis, the nature of the proposition itself is dependent on the individual perspective. Contextual values shape knowledge (Ruphy, 2006). Evidential relevance is defined in reference to existing assumptions. The same data often serves as evidence for multiple distinct hypotheses.

While this realization of relativity does cause one to question the content of any specific theory, it does not invalidate the purpose of science in general (Ruphy, 2006). The integrity of scientific disciplines is maintained as long as all ideas are open to all forms of criticism. The influence of subjective preferences is mitigated through critical interactions between individuals with distinct perspectives. However, although the resulting principles may not include the influence of any specific culture, they are still limited by the fundamental conditions of subjectivity. Even if the scientific community removes all personal biases from a theory, the representation is never more than a hypothetical interpretation. All such concepts must remain perpetually open to falsification (Kabadayi, 2007). The propositional foundations of knowledge are only conditional and never absolute.

References

Çakir, M. (2012). Epistemological dialogue of validity: Building validity in educational and social research. Education, 132(3), 664-674.

Creswell, J. W. (2009). Research Design (3rd Ed.). Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications.

Dicken, P. (2009). Constructive empiricism and the vices of voluntarism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 17(2), 189-201. doi: 10.1080/09672550902794421.

Kabadayi, T. (2007). The second verificationists. Eurasian Journal of Educational Research, 29, 35-43.

Ladyman, J., Douven, I., Horsten, L., & van Fraassen, B. C. (1997). A defence of van Fraassen’s critique of abductive inference: Reply to Psillos. Philosophical Quarterly, 47, 305–21.

Ruphy, S. (2006). "Empiricism all the way down": A defense of the value-neutrality of science in response to Helen Longino's contextual empiricism. Perspectives on Science, 14(2), 189-214.

Steup, M. (2011). Empiricism, metaphysics, and voluntarism. Synthese, 178(1), 19-26. doi:10.1007/s11229-009-9518-8

Van Fraassen, B. (2004). Précis of the empirical stance. Philosophical Studies, 121, 127–132.