Religious Foundations of Morality

The numerous types of moral foundations can essentially be reduced to two systems of justification, objective authority or subjective reason. (Thiroux & Krasemann, 2012) Morality founded on authority is the result of some external source, while arguments from reason are justifications made within oneself. (Thiroux & Krasemann, 2012) This distinction reflects the position of the subject in reference to objectivity. Since values are defined by the subjective perceptions, any objective source of morality is an invalid induction. (Millar, 2011) Religious foundations of morality make the logical error of deriving an imperative from descriptions of reality.

Accepting the cultural significance of religion does not require belief in the doctrine. Many individuals and societies have founded their moral systems on religious texts. The consequences of this are disputable. However, the validity of such a foundation is not dependent on the success of any particular context.

If the believers of a religion accept the contents of their canon as absolute truth, it would seem logical to adopt any system of morality present in the sacred documents. (Thiroux & Krasemann, 2012) However, absolute truth must be applicable in all circumstances. This results in a contradictory consequence as the universal code must then be applied to those who do not accept the truth of the doctrine. (Thiroux & Krasemann, 2012)

The nature of the contradiction in religious systems of morality results from the fact that subjective perceptions are not necessarily identical to objective reality. (Millar, 2011) The subject constructs perceptions to interpret the meaning of sensory experience. (Flood, 2010) However, this empirical influence on knowledge does not guarantee any truth in the subjective account, as the sensory experience is defined by properties of the subject as well as the object. (Millar, 2011) When constructing the phenomenological account, the subject projects attributes onto objectivity that are really only artifacts of sensory physiology. (Flood, 2010)

The only rational conclusion of this relationship is the nihilistic reduction of supposed objective truth knowledge to mere functional propositions. (Millar, 2011) This epistemic limitation prevents pure subjective consciousness of any absolute truth. (Millar, 2011) Any description of objectivity is only an account of the subjective experience. (Flood, 2010) Meaningful prescriptions must be rationally constructed by the subject and then compared to experience in order to verify accuracy. (Millar, 2011) This unidirectional consciousness is invalid if reversed in the opposite function. (Millar, 2011)

To interpret meaning in reality, the subject must rationally create a universal principle that is then deductively applied to particular situations. (Millar, 2011) There is no rational inductive derivative of universal concepts from isolated examples since it is not possible to verify every instance of the rule’s application. Deductive reasoning can be improved through correction in response to error as in the scientific method of verification. (Millar, 2011) Induction is hopelessly trapped in the antecedence of any individual event. (Millar, 2011)

Religious foundations of morality are always flawed since the induction of a universal principle from a particular example is an invalid derivation of a prescriptive imperative from a descriptive interpretation. (Thiroux & Krasemann, 2012) Morals are rules of conduct that function to satisfy subjective valuations. Justifying values based on any objective source claims that the perception is equivalent to the object. However, since consciousness is a reference between the subject and the object, the object is unknowable in itself. (Millar, 2011) The only valid foundation of morality is one that can be arrived at through reason. (Thiroux & Krasemann, 2012) The valuations and perceptions that justify a moral system can be assessed in reference to objectivity only if they are defined by the subject. (Thiroux & Krasemann, 2012) Such functional comparisons are not possible if the subject accepts some authority as the absolute source of truth. (Millar, 2011)

References

Thiroux, J.P., & Krasemann, K.W. (2012) Ethics: Theory and practice, Eleventh Edition. Upper Saddle River: Pearson Education Inc.

Flood, A. (2010) Understanding phenomenology. Nurse Researcher, 17(2), 7-15

Millar, B. (2011) Sensory phenomenology and perceptual content. The Philosophical Quarterly, 61(244), 558-576